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�̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �Why�are�thoughts�without�content�empty,�and�intuitions�without�concepts�blind?��What� � � �are���emptiness���and���blindness���here?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�distinction�between�intuitions�and�concepts�explain�the�transition�from�the� � p �Aesthetic�to�the�Logic?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Is�Transcendental�Logic�a�faculty?�a�science?�p@r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�distinction�between�pure�and�empirical�concepts?�X( r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�there�no�sufficient�and�general�criterion�of�truth?�@ r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Given�this,�what�is�the�status�of�Kant��s�concern�for�truth?��What�is�his�notion�of� (�  �truth?��In�what�sense�does�he�claim�truth�for�his�results�and�in�what�sense�not?� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�distinction�between�analytic�and�dialectical�logic?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�result�of�using�general�logic�(which�is�a�canon)�as�an�organon?����� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�� �clue���to�the�discovery�of�all�pure�concepts?���� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�Kant�call�the�understanding�an�� �absolute�unity���(B.92)?���r�#r�# Ѐ� � �������0 r �Why�are�concepts�predicates?����hr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�table�of�judgments?��How�does�Kant�arrive�at�it?��Why�is�he�sure�it�is�accurate� �P �and�complete?� r�#r�# ��� �Day�6.� �Analytic�of�Concepts,�B.102-29;��NKS��111-28� 8 �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�is�the�relation�between�the�table�of�judgments�and�the�table�of�categories?��Why� �� �does�he�need�both?��How�did�he�get�from�the�former�to�the�latter?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�the�table�of�categories�known�to�be�complete?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�third�category�in�each�triad�arise�from�the�combination�of�the�first�two?�� |r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�are�categories?��!dr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�synthesis?�|"Lr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Are�the�structures�of�cognition�shared�by�all�rational�beings?��Are�they�subject�to� d#4 �historical�change�or�evolution?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�method�has�Kant�used�to�learn�the�structures�of�cognition?��How�have�these� 4%  �structures�come�to�know�themselves?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�a�transcendental�deduction?��What�is�its�task?��Why�is�it�necessary�to�Kant��s� '�" �project?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�we�know�that�the�categories�apply���a�priori��to�objects?����(� $r�#r�# ��� �Day�7.� �Transcendental�Deduction�in�the�A�edition,�A.95-130;��NKS��129-50� �*t"& ��� ����Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)���� x,H$( �� � �������0 r �That�a�unity�of�consciousness�is�required�to�ground�the�knowledge�(or�experience)�of� 0 �� �objects;� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�unity�of�rules�(concepts,�categories)�grounds�the�empirical�unity�of�apperception;� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�transcendental�unity�of�apperception�is�the�ground�of�all�concepts;�� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�empirical�consciousness�(and�its�unity)�presuppose�a�transcendental�consciousness� � � �(and�its�unity).� r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�is�the�central�task�or�question�of�the�transcendental�deduction?��(Part�of�the�answer� p@ �appeared�in�last�week��s�reading,�and�part�appears�in�this�week��s.)� r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Why�is�this�task�important�to�his�program�in�the���Critique��as�you�understand�it�so� @  �far?� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�A�version�of�the�deduction�meet�the�task�of�a�deduction?��Drop�out� �  �inessential�detail�and�try�to�state�the�question�Kant�is�trying�to�address�and�the�answer�provided�by�the�deduction.� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Is�the�transcendental�unity�of�apperception�the�producer�or�the�product�of�the�categories?�� ��  �both?��neither?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�the�understanding�a�derivative�faculty?��hr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�understanding�determine�sensibility?��Pr�#r�# ��� �Day�8.� �Transcendental�Deduction�in�the�B�edition,�B.129-69;��NKS��151-75� P  �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �How�do�the�first�and�second�editions�of�the�deduction�differ?� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�distinction�between�empirical�and�transcendental�apperception?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�empirical�consciousness�presuppose�pure�consciousness?�����r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�deduction�set�limits�to�the�valid�employment�of�the�categories?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�can�Kant�know�that�no�categories�apply�to�noumena?��Or,�how�can�he�know�that� � | �their�valid�employment�is�limited�to�objects�of�experience?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�are�the�differences�among�the�original�unity�of�apperception�and�the�other�(derived)� |"L �unities�of�apperception?��How�are�they�related�to�each�other?� r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �e.g.�synthetic�unity,�analytic�unity,�objective�unity,�transcendental�unity,�subjective� L$ �unity,�empirical�unity� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �How�should�we�distinguish�judgments�about�objects�valid�only�under�my�subjective� &�! �(�Humean�)�associations�and�habits�from�judgments�valid�for�all,�publicly,�objectively?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�Kant�preserve�the�public,��sharable��character�of�knowledge?��How�does�he�avoid� �'�# �the�conclusion�that�consciousness�generates�all�there�is?��How�does�he�avoid�solipsism?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�are�we�the�law-givers�to�nature?��)�!%r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�should�we�distinguish�the�unity�of�consciousness�that�is�the�same�in�each�of�us�from� �*t"& �the�self�that�is�different�in�each�of�us?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�should�we�distinguish�the�I�that�thinks�from�the�I�that�intuits�itself?���t,D$(r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�kinds�of�self�are�there?��What���is��a�human�being?�\-,%)r�#r�# ЇIf�you��re�feeling�especially�courageous�and�adventuresome,�here�are�some�more�specific�questions:�� � �������0 r �Why�does�analysis�presuppose�synthesis�more�than,�or�rather�than,�vice�versa?� �r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Does�this�help�us�figure�out�how�the�analytic�unity�of�apperception�presupposes�the�  � �synthetic�unity�of�apperception?��(B.133�and�B.133.�n.)�� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�the�necessary�unity�of�apperception�an�analytic�proposition�that�nevertheless� � � �reveals�the�necessity�of�synthesis?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�the�understanding�� �the�faculty�of�apperception�itself���(B.134.n),�� �nothing�but�the� � p �faculty�of�combining���a�priori�����(B.135)�� �and�of�bringing�the�manifold�of�given� �X �representations�under�the�unity�of�apperception���(B.135)?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�an�object�� �that�in�the�concept�of�which�the�manifold�of�a�given�intuition�is� X(  �unified���(B.137),�or�� �a�determinate�space���(B.138)?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�copula�express�the�relation�of�subject�and�predicate�� �to�original� (�  �apperception���(B.142)?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�role�of�imagination�in�the�argument�of�the�� �A���deduction?��Why�is�it�missing� ��  �from�the�� �B���edition?� r�#r�# ��� �Day�9.� �Analytic�of�Principles,��Schematism�,�B.169-87;��NKS��176-87� �� �̜���Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)����� � �������0 r �That�a�schema�is�in�one�respect�intellectual�and�in�another�sensible;��l<r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�a�schema�is�necessary�for�a�concept�to�stand�in�relation�to�an�object;��T$r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�possibility�of�experience�gives�objective�reality�to�all�our���a�priori��modes�of� <  �knowledge;�� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�all�intuitions�are�extensive�magnitudes;�� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�there�is�an���a�priori��anticipation�of�something�empirical�and�sensory;����r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�is�the�distinction�between�concepts�and�principles?�� |r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�central�task�or�question�of�the��schematism�?��How�is�it�similar�to,�and� �!d �different�from,�the�central�task�or�question�of�the�deduction?��Why�are�both�chapters�necessary?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�subsumption?��Why�is�it�a�problem?�L$r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�time�fitted�to�render�concepts�and�intuitions�� �homogenous��?���4% r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�are�schemata,�images,�and�concepts�to�be�distinguished?�&�!r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�do�schemata,�rather�than�images,�underlie�pure�sensible�concepts?�'�"r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�the�schemata�match�or�correspond�to�the�categories?��'�#r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�the�schemata�simultaneously���realize���and���restrict���the�application�of�the� �(� $ �categories?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Are�there�schemata�for�empirical�concepts,�or�only�for�pure�concepts�(categories)?��*t"&r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Now�that�you�know�what�schemata�are,�how���do��we�perform�subsumption?��+\#'r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�the�principles�match�or�correspond�to�the�categories?�t,D$(r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�the�principles�provide�rules�for�the�objective�employment�of�the�categories?���\-,%)r�#r�# Ї� �Day�10.� �Analytic�of�Principles,�Axioms�and�Anticipations,�B.187-218;��NKS��188-208� 0 �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�are�axioms�of�intuition?���� �r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �How�or�why�do�they�align�with�the�categories�of�quantity?�� �4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �What�are�anticipations�of�perception?�� �r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �How�or�why�do�they�align�with�the�categories�of�quality?�� t4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �Why�are�the�axioms�called�� �axioms��?��\r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�highest�principle�of�all�analytic�judgments?��tDr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�highest�principle�of�all�synthetic�judgments?�\, r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�Kant��s�theory�of�� �self-evident���truths?���D r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�pure�mathematics�apply�to�objects?���,� r�#r�# ���& � �� �Day�11.� �Analytic�of�Principles,�Analogies,�'��{TԀB.218-265;��NKS��208-38� ��  �̜���Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)���̀� � �������0 r �That�changing�appearances,�and�time�itself,�presuppose�an�unchanging�substance;���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�our�subjective�synthesis�can�be�made�objective�only�by�a�rule�of�causation;���pr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�analogies�(taken�together)�indicate�that�all�appearances�lie�in�only�one�nature;����Xr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�not�all���a�priori��certainties�are�demonstrable;�p@r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�material�idealism�is�false;��X(r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �Do�the�analogies�seem�constitutive�to�you?��r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�are�the�analogies�called�� �analogies��?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�difference�between�things�in�themselves�and�substance?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�prevents�us�from�ordering�things�temporally�in�different�ways?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�status�does�the�principle�of�sufficient�reason�have�for�Kant?��For�example,�is�it� � � �empirically�real�and�transcendentally�ideal?�� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Are�noumena�subject�to�no�causality�at�all,�or�to�a�non-standard�type�of�causality?��"Pr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�did�Kant�not�even�try�to�prove�the�analogies?�h#8r�#r�# ��� �Day�12.� �Analytic�of�Principles,�Postulates,�B.265-294;��NKS��239-56� 8%  �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�is�the�nature�and�basis�of�Kant��s�denial�of�ESP�and�other�parapsychological� �'�# �phenomena?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�outer�experience�provide�the�basis�of�inner�experience�rather�than���vice�versa��?�� �)�!% �B.276�77,�278�79� r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Is�Kant��s�claim�that�inner�experience�requires�outer�experience�consistent�with�his� �+d#' �position�that�outer�sense�is�conditioned�by�inner�sense?��� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �What�kind(s)�of�idealism�has�Kant�refuted?��What�kind(s)�does�he�endorse?�d-4%)r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Why�does�the�refutation�of�idealism�occur�in�the�middle�of�the�postulates?�04�#4�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Why�was�it�added�in�the�B�edition?� �4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �Kant�says�(B.282)�that�the�reader�should�be�able�to�align�the���a�priori��laws�of�nature�with�  � �the�categories.��Can�you?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�don��t�the�modal�categories�extend�our�knowledge?��How�does�this�principle� � � �undermine�the�ontological�argument�for�God��s�existence?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�it�that�consciousness�of�my�existence�is�the�immediate�consciousness�of�the� � p �existence�of�other�objects�outside�me?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�Kant�deny�Berkeley��s�principle�that���esse�est��percipi���(to�be�is�to�be�perceived)?���p@r�#r�# ��� �Day�13.� �Phenomena�and�Noumena,�B.294-315,�B.346-49;��NKS��257-75,�294-96� @  �̜���Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)����� � �������0 r �That�the�categories�do�not�apply�to�noumena;��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�concept�of�a�noumenon�is�a�merely�limiting�concept�whose�function�is�to�curb� ��  �the�pretensions�of�sensibility;��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�unity�of�reason�is�not�the�unity�of�a�possible�experience;����r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�the�soul,�world,�and�God�are�the�only�three�(types�of)�transcendental�ideas;����lr�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �Does�Kant��s�position�on�the�unknowability�of�noumena�allow�him�to���know�that��there�are� T$ �noumena?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�difference�between�the�positive�and�negative�sense�of�noumena?��Which�does� $� �Kant�use�(most)?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�Kant�posit�things�in�themselves,���exactly��?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�price�would�he�pay�for�omitting�or�denying�them?���r�#r�# ��� �Day�14.� �Transcendental�Dialectic,�through�Transcendental�Ideas,�B.349-96;��NKS��297-326� � | �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �What�is�the�distinction�between�the�immanent�and�the�transcendental?��between�the� h#8 �transcendental�and�the�transcendent?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�transcendental�illusion?��What�is�the�critique�of�transcendental�illusion?�8% r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�transcendental�illusion�different�from�empirical�illusion?��logical�illusion?��other�  &�! �forms�of�error?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �When�Kant�says�that�transcendental�illusion�is�natural�and�inevitable�for�reason,�what� �'�# �kinds�of�remedy�for�this�illusion�has�he�ruled�out�and�what�kinds�has�he�left�himself?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�it�important�for�Kant�to�distinguish�reason�and�understanding?��What�is�the� �)�!% �distinction?��(Is�it�finicky�or�fundamental?)� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�do�ethical�questions�begin�to�emerge�as�we�move�from�understanding�to�reason?��+`#'r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�does�Kant�mean�by�condition,�conditioned,�unconditioned,�and�series�of� x,H$( �conditions?�`-0%)r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Is�it�epistemically�commendable�or�regrettable�that�reason�should�seek,�for�its�conditioned� 0 �knowledge,�the�unconditioned�whereby�its�unity�is�brought�to�completion?��(See�B.364.)� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�Kant��s�critique�of�Plato��s�theory�of�ideas?�� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�the�transcendental�ideas�match�or�correspond�to�the�categories?�� �r�#r�# ��� �Day�15.� �Transcendental�Dialectic,�Antinomies,�B.396�398,�B.432-512;��NKS��327�28,��NKS�� � � �384-435���0 � �����Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)���� ��#��# �� � �������0 r �That�there�is�an�entirely�natural�antithetic�of�reason;�\, r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�are��are��only�four�antinomies;��D r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�human�reason�is�by�nature�architectonic.���,� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�freedom�and�natural�necessity�(through�causation)�can�exist�without�conflict�in�one� �  �and�the�same�action;�� r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about���̢�����������&;�L� 8h� ���������5;�L� 8h� ������������1;�L� 8h� ������������-;�L� 8h� ������ � �������0 r �What�is�an�antinomy?��How�does�it�differ�from�an�ordinary�contradiction?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�would�it�mean�to���solve���an�antinomy?�����r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Can�you�anticipate�what�Kant�will�say�in�Sections�6�and�7�(B.�518ff�)?�l�4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �What�price�would�we�pay�to�leave�the�antinomies�unsolved?�T�r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�do�we�know���a�priori��that�solutions�exist?�<� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �In�what�sense�are�antinomies�inevitable?���$x!r�#r�# Ѐ�������0 r �What�does�the�inevitability�of�the�antinomies�reveal�about�reason?� `"r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�do�the�four�theses�have�in�common?�the�four�antitheses?��H#r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�role�does�the�unconditioned�play�in�generating�the�antinomies?��0$r�#r�# ��� �Day�16.� �Transcendental�Dialectic,�Antinomies,�B.513-85;��NKS��436-84� � & �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �How�do�the�solutions�to�the�mathematical�antinomies�differ�from�the�solutions�to�the� h#�(! �dynamical�antinomies?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�role�of�skepticism�in�non-skeptical�philosophy?���8%�*#r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�Kant��s�answer�to�Berkeley�on�the�question�whether�things�exist�when�they�are�  &t+$ �not�being�perceived?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�Kant�allow�us�to�conceive�the�passage�of�time�(and�the�reality�of�past�objects)� �'D-& �prior�to�our�own�existence?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�importance�of�Kant��s�repeated�claim�that�conditioned�objects�� �set�us�a�task��?��)/(r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�Kant�resolve�the�conflict�of�reason�with�itself?��Does�he�use�reason?����*�/)r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�can�reason���solve���its�own�antinomies?��Why�don��t�they�disable�reason�from�this� �+�0* �kind�of�self-cure�and�ensure�their�own�permanence?� r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Why�isn��t�any���rational��solution���a�priori��suspect?�`-�2,4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �Why�would�the�arguments�on�both�sides�of�each�antinomy�be�well�grounded�if� 0 �appearances�were�things�in�themselves?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�the�world�neither�finite�nor�infinite?��� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�Kant��s�theory�of�freedom?��How�is�freedom�compatible�with�natural�causality?��� �r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�transcendental�idealism�(which�Kant�affirms�at�B.�518ff�)�differ�from�material� � � �idealism�(which�he�refuted�at�B.�274ff�)?� r�#r�# ���& � �� �Day�17.� �Transcendental�Dialectic,�Ideal�of�Reason,�Appendix,�B.595-611,��'����[B.611-70],�B.670-732;� �X ТNKS��485-95,�[495-531],�532-70�̜���Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one):������Theses�to�explicate�(pick�one)����� � �������0 r �That�transcendental�ideas�never�allow�of�any�constitutive�employment;��,� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�reason�is�needed�for�the�proper�employment�of�the�understanding;���� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�logical�law�presupposes�transcendental�law;���� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �That�pure�reason�contains�nothing�but�regulative�principles;���� r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �How�seriously�(or�in�what�sense)�does�Kant�intend�the�argument�for�the�existence�of�God� �l �at�B.599-608?��� r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Is�this�one�of�the�dialectical�inferences�leading�to�illusion?���l<4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�Kant��s�theory�of�God�similar�to,�and�different�from,�his�theory�of�noumena?�T$r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�is�the�unity�of�understanding�a�criterion�of�the�truth�of�its�rules?���< r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�the�regulative�employment�of�reason�necessary�for�reason,�for�understanding,�for� $� �empirical�knowledge,�and�for�experience?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�are�regulative�principles�permissible�when�constitutive�principles�are�not?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�a�heuristic�as�opposed�to�a�regulative�or�constitutive�idea?�����r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Watch�for�Kant��s�repeated�use�of�the�� �as�if���construction.��What�is�his�epistemological� �� �point�in�saying�that�sometimes�we�should�or�may�see���x����as�if��it�were���y��when�it�is�not?�� |r�#r�# ��� �Day�18.� �Doctrine�of�Method,�Discipline,�B.735-825;��NKS��573-630� |"L �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �If�today��s�reading�marks�the�transition�from�the�Doctrine�of�Elements�to�the�Doctrine�of� 8%  �Method,�then�how�does�it�help�us�understand�what�Kant�means�by�� �method��?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�Kant�certify�that�his�methods�are�reliable�ones?�'�"r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�is�the�Discipline�so�much�devoted�to�the�differences�between�philosophy�and� �'�# �mathematics?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�must�philosophy�and�mathematics�use�different�methods?��How�must�they�differ?��)�!%r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �When�Kant�says�� �[�t]here��is�thus�no�real�antithetic�of�pure�reason���(B.771)�is�he�retracting� �*x"& �or�only�qualifying�an�earlier�set�of�claims?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�faith?��Why�is�it�legitimate�when�knowledge�is�not�available?��Is�it�ever� x,H$( �illegitimate?��`-0%)r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �In�exactly�what�sense�does�Kant�accept�the�ideas�of�God�and�immortality?��In�what�sense� 0 �does�he�not�accept�them?��What�grounds�and�interests�justify�or�impel�him?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Evaluate�Heinrich�Heine��s�claim�that�Kant�brought�God�back�in�the�Dialectic�in�a�way�  � �inconsistent�with�the�Analytic.� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�seriously�(or�in�what�sense)�does�Kant�intend�his�claim�that�without�the�critique�of� � � �reason,�reason�could�settle�its�claims�only�through�war?��What�other�passages�suggest�aϢsocio�-political�dimension�to�Kant��s�theory�of�reason?��� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�practical�reason�have�the�right�to�postulate�what�speculative�reason�cannot� �X �prove?��� r�#r�# ��� �Day�19.� �Doctrine�of�Method,�Canon,�B.825-84;��NKS��630-69� @  ��No�explication�due�this�week.��But,�in�case�you�can��t�break�the�habit,�try�this�one�for�your�own�benefit�(not�to�hand�in):�� � �������0 r �That�practical�reason�has�the�right�to�postulate�what�speculative�reason�has�no�right�to� ��  �assume�without�sufficient�proof.� r�#r�# �̜���Questions�to�think�about:������Questions�to�think�about����� � �������0 r �Why�is�ethics�not�part�of�transcendental�philosophy?��Tr�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�does�the�practical�or�moral�employment�of�the�principles�of�pure�reason�give�them� l< �objective�reality?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�kinds�of�freedom�are�we�known�to�have�and�what�kinds�are�we�not�known�to�have?�< r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�can�the�same�action�be�regarded�as�both�free�and�determined?�$�r�#r�# �� � �� r �������0 4 �Are���all��of�our�actions�both�free�and�determined�in�this�way?��Or�are�some�of�our�  � �actions�unfree�and�� �simply�determined��?� 4�#4�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�Kant��s�moral�argument�for�God�and�immortality?���r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Does�Kant�think�an�atheist�can�be�moral?��(Does�Kant��s�moral�argument�for�God�make� �� �faith�rationally�permissible,�or�rationally�obligatory?)� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �How�has�Kant�united�nature�and�freedom,�or�natural�science�and�ethics,�or�speculative� �!d �and�practical�reason?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�is�the�relationship�that�Kant�envisions�between�his��propaedeutic��and�his�system?���d#4r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �What�kind�of�metaphysics�is�Kant�hoping�to�do,�and�what�kind�has�he�tried�to�kill�off� L$ �once�and�for�all?� r�#r�# �� � �������0 r �Why�does�Kant�give�such�short�shrift�to�the�history�of�pure�reason?�&�!r�#r�# �����% � ����